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Abstract
This paper revisits and extends the experiment on the solidarity game
by Selten and Ockenfels (1998). We replicate the basic design of the soli-
darity game and extend it in order to test the robustness of the ’ﬁxed total
sacriﬁce’ eﬀect and the applied strategy method. Our results only partially
conﬁrm the validity of the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce eﬀect. In a treatment with
constant group-endowment rather than constant winner-endowment the
predominance of the ’ﬁxed total sacriﬁce’ behavior is replaced by ’ﬁxed
relative gift’ behavior. We additionally introduce a measure of personality
characteristics and compare its speciﬁc components with pro-social gift
behavior in our experiments. We don’t ﬁnd correlations between actual
gift behavior and measures of empathy-driven pro-social behavior used in
social science.
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Solidarity behavior has been studied in experimental economics introducing a
particular type of game based on conditional gifts (Selten and Ockenfels, 1998;
Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999). In this experiment three participants play a
one-shot game in which each of them has a two-thirds probability of winning a
ﬁxed amount of money, and one third probability of ending up with nothing.
Before knowing the result of the random draw, each participant must indicate
the amount of money (gift) she would like to hand over in case she is going to
be a winner, i.e. she has to specify the gift that she would dispense in the case
of one loser and in the case of two losers in the group. The total gift can be
any amount between zero and the total amount she might win. This procedure
corresponds to the ’strategy method’ introduced by Selten (1967). ’Solidarity’
in this context means voluntary gift giving by lucky winners to needy losers
in a group. The interaction is characterized by an unfavorable situation that
could potentially aﬀect everybody but eventually will aﬀect only one part of
the population (the needy person(s)).1
The results of Selten and Ockenfels (1998) show two major features. First,
the majority of subjects send positive gifts and second, the predominance of
a behavior called by the authors ’ﬁxed total sacriﬁce’. Subjects of their ex-
periments seem to use a two stage reasoning in which they ﬁrst determine the
amount they want to keep for themselves and then distribute the remaining
amount (if any) among the needy person(s). This means that the total amount
of gift is independent from the number of recipients, i.e., is the same for one or
two recipients.
Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) replicate the Selten-Ockenfels solidarity game
in Magdeburg (East Germany) with exactly the same procedure as it was used
in Bonn (West Germany). They ﬁnd the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce eﬀect as well. Ad-
ditionally they observe that eastern subjects give signiﬁcantly less than western
subjects, which is driven by a higher proportion of egoistical behavior (sending
zero to both, to one loser and to two losers).
In this paper, we test the robustness of the two major features of the original
solidarity game: positive gifts and the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce. Selten and Ockenfels
(1998) argue, that it is the reciprocal element of the strategy method which
makes the solidarity game diﬀerent from simple dictator games, but that it is
still diﬀerent from pure reciprocity, because gifts cannot be reciprocated over
time.
1In the presence of risk aversion, conditional gifts can be seen as a mutually beneﬁtting
insurance arrangement.
2In a similar vein, Stahl and Haruvy (2002) argue that the use of the strategy
method in the sense of making the decision without knowing whether one is a
winner or a loser may distort incentives in favor of egalitarian behavior, and
thus increases gift giving. Deciding how much to give before knowing the result
of the random draw may induce empathy, forcing the subject to ”put herself in
the shoes” of the loser. In this sense we talk about implicit reciprocity, as the
positive eﬀect of giving considering that we might be in the recipient’s situation.
Our ﬁrst Hypothesis follows Selten and Ockenfels (1998) stating that:
Hypothesis 1 The strategy method induces a context in which solidarity based
on implicit reciprocity might be generated, and increases gift giving.
In order to test this hypothesis, we introduce a treatment of a partial play
method (PPM), where people decide after learning that they are a winner, but
still don’t know if they will be matched with 0, 1 or 2 other winners (losers,
respectively) in the group. This is analogous to a dictator game with prior
random entitlement. The act of giving is free from any reasoning based on
reciprocity. If our hypothesis is true and implicit reciprocity generated by the
strategy method plays a role, we should observe a higher level of gift-giving in
the original solidarity game than in our PPM treatment.
The second feature observed in the solidarity game is the ’ﬁxed total sac-
riﬁce’ eﬀect. Selten and Ockenfels (1998) indicate that this type of behavior
is inconsistent with the maximization of an altruistic utility function that in-
cludes payoﬀs of other individuals. In this sense, the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce is an
’anomaly of the anomalies’, because it is related to the ’anomalies’ of giving
to unrelated others (Camerer and Thaler, 1995) on the one hand, but cannot
be captured by a model of altruistic behavior. Rather it has to be classiﬁed
as purely ’self-centered-fairness’ behavior, because the winner keeps his own
income constant, and distributes the rest.
The observation of the ’ﬁxed total sacriﬁce’ behavior might be due to the
fact, that in case of two winners (one loser) and in case of one winner (two losers)
the total group gain varies, i.e., it is equal to 20 DM in the ﬁrst case and 10 DM
in the second case. The subjects might have found an ’internal justiﬁcation’
for giving the same amount to one loser as to two losers considering that in the
second case the total group endowment is reduced by the half. In order to test
this possible eﬀect we introduce a treatment with a constant group endowment
(CGE) for each random move outcome with at least one winner, i.e. for the case
of 1,2 or 3 winners. At the same time, we keep the ex-ante expected winner
and group endowment (nearly) constant to the baseline treatment.
3This leads us to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 In a treatment with a constant group endowment (CGE) we
observe ’ﬁxed total gift’ behavior rather than the ’ﬁxed total sacriﬁce’ eﬀect.
’Fixed total gift’ behavior in treatment CGE can be called ’ﬁxed relative
sacriﬁce’ behavior, as well.
To sum up, the main goal of our study is to test (1) the robustness of
gift giving with regard to the strategy method involved when participants have
to decide about their donations before knowing whether they are a winner or
not and (2) the robustness of the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce eﬀect with regard to the
individual endowment of winners and the group endowment. Moreover, the role
of expectations and their relationship with behavior is considered.
Additionally, in order to check whether the extend of gift giving and the
types of solidarity behavior classiﬁed by Selten and Ockenfels (1998) correspond
to measures used in social science, we introduce a structured questionnaire on
personality characteristics of pro-social behavior corresponding to the Interper-
sonal Reactivity Index, IRI (Davis, 1980; Davis, 1983, see the next section for
a more detailed description). The IRI is of common use in socio-psychological
studies on pro-social behavior, i.e. behavior that is intended to beneﬁt other
people (Carlo, Allan and Buhman, 1999).
The results of our experiments only partially conﬁrm the predominance
of the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce eﬀect in the solidarity game. The replication of
Selten and Ockenfels (1998)’s experiment, and the introduction of the partial
play method reproduce the original results, indicating that the strategy method
plays no role for gift giving in the solidarity game. In contrast, in the treatment
with constant group endowment we ﬁnd that subjects give the same relative gift
to one loser or to each one of the two losers. In other words: the predominant
behavior switches from a self-centered type in the replication treatment to a
other-regarding type in a treatment with constant group endowment. We do
not ﬁnd any correlation between the IRI and the actual gifts. Our extensions
of the original solidarity game yield a better understanding of gift behavior and
the source of ’ﬁxed total sacriﬁce’ behavior.
2 Experimental Design
Our design consists of three treatments. The ﬁrst is a replication of the original
solidarity game of Selten and Ockenfels (1998, further S-O) with some varia-
tions in the experimental procedures. It serves as a baseline for the other two
treatments.
4In S-O and in our ﬁrst treatment (SO-R, ’S-O Replication’), subjects par-
ticipate in a 3-person game. Each subject has the same probability (2/3) of
winning 10 DM in S-O and 10 Euro in our ﬁrst treatment, respectively. Partic-
ipants decide before the random draws without knowing if they are a winner or
not and how the group is matched. Each participant is asked to ﬁll in a decision
form in which she must specify the amount of money she is willing to hand over
to (a) loser(s) in her group in case she will win. Participants are asked to state
two amounts, one for the case of one loser in the group and the other for the
case of two losers. In the latter the amount speciﬁed goes to each one of the
two losers, i.e. the winner pays twice this amount. There is no possibility to
diﬀerentiate the gift among the two losers. Indeed, they had nothing to specify
for the case of no or three losers in the group.
In our second treatment (PPM, ’Partial Play Method’) we introduce a
partial-play method of the SO-R design. The subjects know, before decid-
ing, whether they are winners or losers, and only the winners decide how much
they are willing to hand over to one or two possible losers in the group. Re-
sults of this treatment would give us information about the eﬀect of deciding
before knowing one’s role in a solidarity game, i.e. for the eﬀect of the strategy
method. This treatment serves also as a bridge between the solidarity game
and the dictator game with random entitlement.
Our third experimental treatment (CGE, ’Constant Group Endowment’)
controls for group endowment eﬀects. We keep the total group endowment
constant for each possible scenario of the game. We vary the individual en-
dowment conditional on the cases in which there are three, two, or one winners
in a group. In case of three winners each of them gets 6.70 Euros; in case of
two winners, each of them gets 10 Euros; and in the case of one winner, she
gets 20 Euros. These parameters keep the ex-ante expected group and indi-
vidual endowments of the SO-R treatment (approximately) constant. Table 1
summarizes the design parameters.
In each of the three treatments we asked subjects to answer a 28 item
questionnaire corresponding to the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980;
Davis, 1983, IRI). The subjects had to indicate how a statement describes them
on a 5-point scale (A, B, C, D, and E, with A meaning ”Does not describe
me at all.”, and E indicating ”Describes very well.”). There are items that
are scored in an ascending fashion (+, A=0, B=1, C=2, D=3, and E=4) and
items that are scored in reverse fashion (-, A=4, B=3, C=2, D=1, and E=0).
The questionnaire has four components. Each component is composed of 7
items. The four components are: perspective taking (PT), empathic concern
5Parameters
Treat Winners 3 2 1 0 Ea. exp. Sess. Part. Mon. Ind. Ob
SO-R Ind. End. 10 10 10 - 6.66 2 15 1 30
Gr. End. 30 20 10 0 20
PPM Ind. End. 10 10 10 - 6.66 2 15 1 20
Gr. End. 30 20 10 0 20
CGE Ind. End. 6.7 10 20 - 6.43 2 15 1 30
Gr. End. 20.1 20 20 0 19.29
Table 1: Experimental treatments and parameters. Note: ’Ind. End.’ indicates ’In-
dividual Endowment for each winner’, ’Gr. End.’ indicates ’Group Endowment’, ’Ea.
exp.’ means ’Ex-ante expected’, ’Mon.’ means ’Monitors’, and ’Ind. Ob’ translates to
’Independent Observations’.
(EC), personal distress (PD), and fantasy (FS). Examples of the items for each
component are: ”I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I
make a decision”(PT+), ”Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me
a great deal”(EC-), ”In an emergency situation I feel apprehensive and ill-at-
ease”(PD+), and ”After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were
one of the characters” (F+). These items refer to perspective taking, empathic
concern (reversed-scored), personal distress, and fantasy, respectively. For the
complete list of items see the Appendix.
3 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory of the Max
Planck Institute in Jena, Germany. Participants in this experiment were 96
volunteering undergraduate students from the local Friedrich Schiller Univer-
sity. We ran six sessions with 16 participants (15 subjects plus a monitor) each.
Hence there are 30 independent observations for the SO-R and CGE (20 for
PPM) treatment (see Table 1). The average age of the 90 active participants
(without the monitors) was 23 years, 51 (39) were female (male). The experi-
mental sessions lasted on average one hour; from the time the subjects entered
the lab until the time they left it. The average earning was 9.73 Euro including
a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro.
As Selten and Ockenfels (1998) we used a double blind procedure, i.e.,
neither the experimenter nor the other subjects could ever deduce the iden-
tity of the correspondent decision maker from a decision (see Instructions in
Appendix A). Contrary to Selten and Ockenfels (1998) and Ockenfels and
Weimann (1999) we conducted the experiment in the laboratory rather than
in the students’ restaurant, we used a monitor for the double blind procedure,
6and we payed immediately after the experiment rather than announcing a prize
(lottery) to motivate subjects to show up to collect their payoﬀ.
The SO-R and the CGE treatments followed the same protocol and had
parallel instructions. They diﬀered only with respect to the numbers in the
decision form and the expectation form. The PPM treatment diﬀers in a way
that will be clariﬁed with the following description of the procedure.
During the experiment, every subject received a code number. These codes
were randomly generated sequences of numbers and letters, e.g. 800-C56-Z4B,
or 379-V22-W7D, where the last letter in the code corresponded to the session
number. The code number was printed on the backside of every form to be
ﬁlled in and on the payment envelope.
The complete procedure was as follows:
a. The subjects entered the laboratory and were randomly seated in sepa-
rated cubicles. When everybody was seated, the instructions were dis-
tributed and read aloud always by the same experimenter. Once the
instructions were read, subjects’ questions were answered privately.
b. The subjects were asked to draw an envelope from a box. The box con-
tained 16 ’big’ envelopes. Inside each envelope there was a card with a
code number. In one of these envelopes there was a card marked with
’monitor’ instead of a code number. The monitor had to guarantee to
the other subjects (further the ’active’ subjects), that the experiment was
conducted according to the rules stated in the instructions. He or she did
not participate actively in the game, but was the only contact between
the experimenters and the subjects during the proceeding of the exper-
iment. The monitor was informed privately that he or she will get the
average payoﬀ at the end of the experiment. We asked her not to reveal
this information.
c. Inside the ’big’ envelopes there were three other ’small’ envelopes, a blue,
a green, and a red one. The ’active’ subjects (all the subjects except the
monitor) had to open the blue envelope ﬁrst. In this envelope they found
the decision form. On the decision form the subjects were informed about
all the possible outcomes of the random draws for the role (winner/loser)
and the group matching. In the case of three, two, one winners in a
group each winner earned 10,10 and 10 Euro in SO-R and PPM and
6.7,10,20 Euro in CGE, respectively. In the case of no winner in the
group everybody got zero. The subjects had to specify the amount of
Euros (in Ten-Cent-steps) they were willing to give to the loser in the
7case of two winners in the group and to each one of the two losers in
the case of one winner. Note, that the subjects could not specify two
diﬀerent amounts in the case of two losers. The amount speciﬁed had to
be between 0 and the amount won in the one loser case and between 0
and half of the amount won for the case of two losers. After ﬁlling in the
form they had to put it back into the envelope. Once everybody had ﬁlled
in the decision form the monitor collected them and put them in a box.
In treatment PPM, at the top of the decision form players were informed
whether they were a winner or a loser. The loser’s form was empty, they
just had to put it back into the envelope. The rest of the winner’s form
was the same like in SO-R. The proportion of forms was ﬁxed in each
PPM session to 2/3 (10) winners and 1/3 (5) losers.
d. The active subjects were then asked to open the green envelope. Inside the
green envelope they found another form in which they had to specify their
expectations about the average amount of gift of all (potential) winners in
the case of one loser or two losers. At the time they ﬁlled in the decision
form they were not informed that they will be asked for their expectations,
since knowing that they will have to specify their expectations could have
aﬀected their decisions. The expectation forms were the same for all the
treatments. The losers in treatment PPM had to ﬁll in this form, as well.
The subjects got an extra Euro if one of the amounts speciﬁed was exact
or diﬀered less than 50 cents or 2 extra Euros if both amounts were exact
or diﬀered at most 50 cents from the average amount of gift.
e. The green envelopes were collected by the monitor, and the active subjects
ﬁnally opened and ﬁlled in the last form, which was in the red envelope.
The last form contained the IRI questionnaire and a short questionnaire
asking for age, gender, ﬁeld of studies, and year of study. The items of
the IRI questionnaire were presented in a random order among subjects.
To prevent biasing, we decided to present the subjects the questionnaire
before they learned whether there are a winner or a loser and their mone-
tary income. Indeed, this could not be prevented in the PPM treatment.
The monitor then collected the red envelopes.
f. Once all the red envelopes were collected, in treatment SO-R and CGE
the monitor drew one envelope at a time from the box containing the blue
envelopes with the decision forms. The active subjects and the experi-
menter could control the monitor during this phase. The monitor threw
a six-sided die once for each blue envelope. If one of the numbers 1,2,3,
8or 4 appeared, the monitor wrote ’winner’ on the envelope. If one of
the numbers 5 or 6 appeared, she wrote ’loser’ on the envelope. After
this procedure the monitor put the blue envelopes back into the box and
mixed them. In treatment PPM there was no need for a random draw
for the assignment of winner or loser type. The box already contained 10
winner and 5 loser envelopes.
g. The monitor drew again the envelopes from the box. The envelopes were
randomly matched in groups of three. The experimenters opened the
envelopes that corresponded to each group and calculated the payoﬀs.
Once the payoﬀs of all participants were calculated, the experimenters
opened the green envelopes with the subjects’ expectations, and checked
if they were correct. In the case one or two of the expected values turned
out to be correct or diﬀered less than 0.5 Euro, the subject got one or two
extra Euros, respectively.
h. After the calculation of the payoﬀs, the experimenters put the money
into the payment envelopes which were marked with the code numbers.
Then the experimenters left the room and the monitor distributed the
payment envelopes to the active subjects. They checked if the amount
was exact and left the room after signing a list with all code numbers and
the corresponding payoﬀs. They signed that they had received money
in cash under one of the code numbers printed above. In this way their
payoﬀ was maintained anonymous.
4 Results
4.1 Gift Behavior
In the description of the results we denote g1 as the gift to one loser and g2 as the
gift to each one of two losers; e1 as subjects’ expectation of the average g1 and
e2 as subjects’ expectation of the average g2. Table 2 reports the mean absolute
monetary values of conditional gifts (g1 and g2), the mean absolute values of
the expectations (e1 and e2), and the corresponding values from Selten and
Ockenfels (1998, S-O) and Ockenfels and Weimann (1999, O-W). The relative
frequencies of conditional gift giving are shown in Figure 1 and 2. The individual
decision data is reported in Appendix C.
The absolute values of gifts and expectations for each one of our treatments
are higher than the ones observed by S-O and much higher than in O-W. Indeed,
this may be due to the diﬀerences in the winner’s endowment, which is 10 Euro
9N g1 g2 e1 e2
SO-R 30 1.39 0.96 1.87 1.34
(1.30) (0.82) (1.33) (1.01)
PPM Winners 20 1.53 1.05 2.09 1.38
(1.47) (0.86) (1.51) (0.92)
PPM Losers 10 2.75 1.37
(1.21) (0.76)
CGE 30 1.62 2.84 1.79 2.99
(1.40) (2.31) (1.04) (1.79)
SO (West) 118 1.26 0.80 1.26 0.78
O-W (East) 58/56 0.83 0.52 0.82 0.55
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Average gifts and expectations in Euro (S-O and O-W
results relying on a pie of 10 DM = 5.11 Euro are calculated with the oﬃcial exchange
rate 1 Euro = 1.95583 DM), standard deviations in brackets. Note: g1 is the conditional
gift to one loser, and g2 is the conditional gift to each one of two losers; e1 indicates
subjects’ expectation of g1, and e2 indicates subjects’ expectation of g2.
Figure 1: Relative frequencies of gifts to one loser in group (g1)
in our treatments SO-R and PPM and 10 DM = 5.11 Euro in S-O and O-W.
This sheds a ﬁrst light on the fact that the subject’s decision about the size
of gifts is related to the size of their endowment and therefore relative to their
wealth.
Gift to one loser (g1) The mean values of g1 are 1.39,1.53, and 1.62 in
treatments SO-R, PPM and CGE, respectively. We cannot report any diﬀer-
ences between the means and distributions among our three treatments. The
Kruskall Wallis Test (chi-square = .417, p-value = .812) as well as pair wise
10Figure 2: Relative frequencies of gifts to two losers in group (g2)
Mann-Whitney-U-tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of the same mean
among the three treatments. The two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-
of-ﬁt tests (K-S) comparing pairs of samples cannot reject the hypothesis of the
same distribution for the conditional gift of g1 (p-values equal to .997,.799, and
.723, for the treatments SO-R and PPM, SO-R and CGE, and PPM and CGE,
respectively). This result indicates the stability of the experimental procedure
between the treatments SO-R and CGE, where the experimental procedure and
the parameters for the one loser case were the same, but also indicates that the
introduction of the partial play method in treatment PPM has no eﬀects on
gifts to one loser in the group.
Gift to two losers (g2) The mean values of g2 are .96,1.05, and 2.84, in
treatments SO-R, PPM and CGE, respectively. The Kruskall Wallis Test (chi-
square = 9.19, p-value = .010) rejects the null hypotheses of the same mean
among the three treatments, while pair wise non-parametric Mann-Whitney-U-
tests, as reported in Table 3, indicate this to be true only for the comparisons
of SO-R vs. CGE and PPM vs. CGE, while it is not true for a comparison
of SO-R vs. PPM. The two-tailed K-S test rejects the hypothesis of the same
distribution in treatments SO-R and CGE, and CGE and PPM (p-values equal
to .000, and .002, respectively), but cannot reject the hypothesis of the same
distribution in treatments SO-R and PPM (p-value = 1).
The higher endowment of the winner in the case of two losers yields signif-
icant diﬀerences in gift behavior. However, if we consider the conditional gifts
as a proportion of the winner’s own endowment, g2 for CGE is still higher than
11Exact Signiﬁcance, N g1 g2 e1 e2
2-tailed
PPM winners 20 vs. 30 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
vs. SO-R
SO-R vs. CGE 30 vs. 30 n.s. 0.000 n.s. 0.000
based on absolute values
SO-R vs. CGE 30 vs. 30 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
based on shares of winner’own endowment
Table 3: Non-parametric statistics: 2-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests on diﬀerences in
mean between treatments PPM and SO-R, CGE and SO-R.
for SO-R and PPM (0.142 vs. 0.096 resp. 0.105), but we get no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence among the three means and distributions of gifts.2 Table 4 reports
the mean values of gifts and expectations relative to the winner’s endowment.
N g1 g2 e1 e2
SO-R 30 0.139 0.096 0.187 0.134
PPM Winners 20 0.153 0.105 0.209 0.138
PPM Losers 10 0.275 0.137
CGE 30 0.162 0.142 0.179 0.149
S-O (West) 118 0.246 0.156 0.247 0.153
O-W (East) 58/56 0.162 0.101 0.160 0.108
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics: Average gifts and expectations in share of winner’s
endowment.
Therefore, the subjects seem to determine their gifts relative to their en-
dowment, which is in line with fairness models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000). Moreover, compared to the results (conditional gifts rel-
ative to winner’s own endowment) of S-O and O-W, our results from the East
German town Jena seem to be close to the values of O-W from Magdeburg,
East Germany, but lower than the data of S-O from Bonn, West Germany.
4.2 Behavioral Types in Individual Data
Table 5 reports the relative percentage of types of behavior, resulting from a
decomposition of conditional gift giving, for our treatments as well as for the
original S-O solidarity game. Note, that for our treatment CGE we report both
classiﬁcation types based on absolute gifts and on relative gifts.
2Kruskall-Wallis Test, chi-square = 2.69, p-value = .26; pair wise Mann-Whitney-U-tests
reported in Table 3; pair wise K-S tests on distributions with p-value equal to .134, and .139,
for the treatments SO-R and CGE and CGE and PPM, respectively.
12Types Egoistical g1 > 2g2 Fixed total sacriﬁce Intermediate Fixed gift to loser g2 > g1
exact up to round. exact up to round.
SO-R 0.27 0.03 0.20 0.23 0.07 0.13 0.07
PPM 0.25 0.15 0.20 0.15 0.25
CGE ab 0.30 0.07 0.63
CGE rel 0.30 0.07 0.23 0.30 0.07 0.03
S-O 0.21 0.36 0.16 0.11 0.16
O-W 0.47 0.26 0.09 0.05 0.14
Table 5: Relative frequencies of types of behavior. Entries for treatment ’CGE ab’ and
’CGE rel’ consider the absolute conditional gift and the conditional gift in proportion
of the winners own endowment, respectively.
We use the same deﬁnitions as Selten and Ockenfels (1998), but extend
them with new characteristics of behavior we have observed. Thus, we deﬁne
eight types of behavior:
• Egoistical: Subjects in this category chose g1 = g2 = 0.
• g1 > 2g2: One subject’s behavior of g1 > 2g2 could not be classiﬁed as
ﬁxed total sacriﬁce up to rounding as described below. Thus we had to
create this category.
• Exact ﬁxed total sacriﬁce: Gift behavior with the pattern g1 = 2g2 > 0,
i.e. the same amount was given to one loser as to two losers together, was
classiﬁed in this category.
• Fixed total sacriﬁce up to rounding: As Selten and Ockenfels (1998), we
consider rounding of amounts up to a multiple of the prominence level of
1.00. Cases in this category fulﬁll g1 > 2g2 > 0 or 2g2 > g1 > 0. However,
rounding the gift in this case can only be considered in treatments SO-R
and PPM, because in treatment CGE (relative) ﬁxed total sacriﬁce would
lead to specifying exactly the same absolute amount for one loser as for
each of two losers.
• Intermediate: Behavior, which could not be classiﬁed in other categories,
but where 2g2 > g1 > g2 > 0 holds true, was considered as intermediate.
• Exact ﬁxed gift to losers: When people chose g1 = g2, i.e. gave the same
amount to each loser regardless of whether there are one or two winners
in the group, they were categorized here.
• Fixed gift up to rounding: In our treatment CGE a (relative) ﬁxed gift
means that g1 = 1
2g2. Thus, by analogy to the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce behavior
13we consider rounding to the prominence level of 1.00. However, only 2
subjects fall under this category.
• g2 > g1 = 0: In three cases, we observed this behavior (two times g2 = 1
in SO-R, one time g2 = 2.5 in CGE). This behavior may be explained by
taking over responsibility when being the only winner in the group while
letting the other winner pay in the case of two winners in the group.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of types, where the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce and
the ﬁxed gift behavior are summarized with the corresponding behavior up to
rounding, respectively. In Appendix C we classify each subject according to its
type of behavior described above.
Figure 3: Relative frequencies of types of conditional gift, based on absolute and relative
gifts. Note that for S-O, O-W, SO-R and PPM the categorization is indeed the same
on the base of absolute and relative gifts, while this is not true for treatment CGE.
If we consider absolute gifts, we have to classify 63% of the behavior in
treatment CGE as giving more to each of the two losers than to one loser in the
group. This is not in line with the evidence from our other sessions and from
S-O and O-W, while if one considers the conditional gifts relative to winners’
endowment this portion shrinks to 3% (see Figure 3, ’CGE abs’ and ’CGE rel’).
Thus, again we have evidence that gift giving is relative to the own endowment.
In the following we consider results only on a relative basis.
14Throughout the experiment we observe 27% of egoistic behavior. This pro-
portion is analogous to the result of Selten and Ockenfels (1998), who reported
21% of egoistic behavior, and signiﬁcantly less than the result in Ockenfels and
Weimann (1999), 47%. However, the proportion of egoistic behavior is highest
in CGE and lowest in PPM.
Overall, we observe an amount of 43% of ﬁxed total sacriﬁce behavior in our
replication treatment SO-R compared to 52% in the original S-O game. Note,
that in the latter the portion of classiﬁcation in this category due to rounding
is about 31%, while it is 53% in our data. If there would be no rounding, most
of these data points would belong to intermediate behavior. Despite of this,
we can say that in SO-R we have replicated the S-O game also in the observed
types of behavior. In the PPM treatment we observe 8% less ﬁxed total sacriﬁce
and more intermediate behavior, but these changes are rather small.
In treatment CGE the distribution of behavior changes completely. Only
7% of our participants exhibit the exact ﬁxed total sacriﬁce behavior. The
proportion of intermediate behavior rises to 23%, and about 37% of the subjects
give a ﬁxed gift, i.e. the same amount to one loser as to each of the two losers.
Expected









S-O - - - - -
O-W 22.928** - - - -
(< 0.0001) - - - -
SO-R 1.321 3.404 - - -
(0.747) (0.318) - - -
PPM 2.487 7.553 3.820 - -
(0.488) (0.056) (0.280) - -
CGE rel 25.700** 40.317** 31.687** 8.552* -
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (0.036) -
Table 6: Results from Chi-Square tests for diﬀerences in distribution of behavioral
type groups ’Egoists’, ’Fixed Total Sacriﬁce’, ’Intermediate’ and ’Fixed Gift’ based on
conditional gifts relative to winner’s endowment between treatments SO-R, PPM and
CGE and the data from S-O and O-W. Signiﬁcance values in brackets. * signiﬁcant on
the 5%-level. ** signiﬁcant on the 0.1%-level
Table 6 reports a Chi-Square-Test for diﬀerences in distribution of behav-
ioral types on a relative base between our three treatments and the data from
S-O and O-W. We excluded the three observations from g1 > 2g2 and g−2 > g1
and formed 4 groups of behavioral types: ’Egoistical behavior’, ’Fixed To-
tal Sacriﬁce’ (including rounding), ’Intermediate’ and ’Fixed Gift’ (including
rounding). As it can be seen, we cannot reject the null hypotheses of the same
15distribution of behavioral types for our treatments SO-R and PPM compared
to S-O and O-W, while the S-O and O-W distributions diﬀer. The observed
distribution of behavioral types in our treatment CGE is diﬀerent from the
observed distributions of all other treatments and experiments.
4.3 Expectations
Table 2 and 4 summarize subjects’ expectations e1 and e2 in the three treat-
ments for absolute and relative values, respectively. The values are very close to
the observed conditional gifts, but slightly higher. Overall, 18% of the subjects
estimated both expected values correctly (in a range of ±0.5); 25% and 24% of
the subjects guessed the value of the g1 and g2 correctly (in a range of ±0.5), re-
spectively. Spearman rank tests (rho=.64, for the g1 and e1, one-tailed p-value
< .01; and rho=.653, for the g2 and e2 proportional to winner’s own endow-
ment, one-tailed p-value < .01) show a high and signiﬁcant correlation among
choices and expectations. However, as Table 7 reports, Wilcoxon Matched Pairs
Signed Ranks tests show that in treatments SO-R and PPM subjects expect
signiﬁcantly higher gifts from others than they actually contribute themselves.
N e1 vs. g1 e2 vs. g2
SO-R 30 0.017** 0.036*
CGE 30 n.s. n.s.
PPM Winners 20 0.016** 0.017**
PPM Losers 10 vs. 20 0.007** n.s.
Table 7: Are expectations greater than donations? Results from 1-sided Wilcoxon
Matched Pairs Signed Ranks Test of e1 vs. g1 and e2 vs. g2 for SO-R, CGE and PPM
winners and from one-sided Mann-Whitney-U test between e1 (e2) of PPM losers and
g1 (g2) of PPM winners. *signiﬁcant on the 5%-level, one-tailed; **signiﬁcant on the
2.5%-level, one-tailed; ***signiﬁcant on the 1%-level, one-tailed
Figure 4 shows that this result is driven by a high number of low-contribution
higher-expectation data points compared to a low number of high-contribution
lower-expectation subjects. Egoistic people guess right that the average gift is
higher than their own, and altruists are right expecting that most other people
will contribute less.
4.4 Demographic Characteristics
The results of our experiment show the absence of a gender eﬀect (two-tailed
Mann-Whitney U-tests, p-values equal to .86, and .697, for the one loser case
and the two losers case, respectively). The proportion of egoistical behavior,
16Figure 4: Donations and expectations in the solidarity game. The size of the bubbles
represents the number of cases observed for a data point. Furthermore, the 45’ line
(solid), and the least square regression trend lines for g1,e1 (dotted) and g2,e2 (short
lined) are included.
i.e. zero gifts in both cases, is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between sexes. This
result is diﬀerent from the ﬁnding of Selten and Ockenfels (1998), but is similar
to other results in dictator games (Bolton and Katok, 1995a). There is also no
correlation between gifts and expectations on the one hand and age or semester
of university study on the other hand.








































N 32 20 30 8
N w/o 30 18 25 7
PPM Losers (36%) (22%) (33%) (9%)
g1 0.112 0.176 0.173 0.177
g2 0.082 0.138 0.125 0.171
e1 0.164 0.227 0.195 0.186
e2 0.119 0.144 0.158 0.161
Table 8: Groups of ﬁelds of studies and actual decisions and expectations.
17We observe an eﬀect, which one could call ’economist eﬀect’. Table 8 reports
means of gifts and expectations for diﬀerent ﬁelds of study. A two-tailed Mann-
Whitney-U test for the relative gifts and expectations in all treatments yields
that subjects studying economics and related studies come from a diﬀerent
population than subjects from other ﬁelds regarding actual gifts g1 (p = 0.047)
and g2 (p = 0.012), while the same distribution of expectations e1 (p = 0.220)
and e2 (p = 0.227) cannot be rejected. Overall, 40% of the economists are
classiﬁed as ’egoists’, while this is true only for 20% of students from other
studies. Contrary to Selten and Ockenfels (1998) we ﬁnd no interaction eﬀect
between ﬁeld of study, gender and gift giving.
4.5 Personality Characteristics
We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation among the scores on the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (IRI) and the individual conditional gifts and expectations
in the solidarity game (except a positive non-parametric Spearman correlation
between PD and e2 at the 5%-level with p = 0.048). Indeed, subjects that
hand over a higher amount of their endowment to the loser(s) did not score
higher in the IRI. Higher score on the IRI means a higher level of pro-social
attitude. Table 9 shows average scores for the four components of the IRI,
’perspective taking’, ’fantasy’, ’empathic concern’, and ’personal distress’. The
table shows no signiﬁcant diﬀerence among the three levels of gifts to one loser,
’low’ (g1 < 0.5), ’medium’ (0.5 ≤ g1 < 2.5), and ’high’ (g1 ≥ 2.5). Table 10
considers the decomposition in types of behavior: egoistic behavior, ﬁxed total
sacriﬁce, ﬁxed gift, and positive gift to two losers and zero gift to one loser.
This table does not report any particular pattern of behavior related to any
speciﬁc feature of the IRI.
LOW MED HIGH
N 26 30 24
IRI 55.81 55.10 55.88
PT 14.15 13.87 14.00
FS 13.19 13.90 14.46
EC 14.88 15.00 14.33
PD 13.58 12.33 13.08
Table 9: Average scores in the perspective taking, fantasy, emphatic concern, and
personal distress for low (g1 < 0.5), medium (0.5 <= g1 < 2.5), and high (g1 >= 2.5)
conditional gift to one loser.
18Egoistical g1 > 2g2 Fixed total sacriﬁce Intermediate Fixed gift g2 > g1 = 0
N 22 1 23 11 20 3
PT 13.91 13.00 13.00 14.18 14.95 15.67
FS 13.32 15.00 13.57 14.73 14.50 11.67
EC 15.09 16.00 14.91 14.45 14.50 13.67
PD 13.18 13.00 13.61 10.82 12.65 16.33
Table 10: Average scores in the perspective taking (PT), fantasy (FS), emphatic con-
cern (EC), and personal distress (PD) for types of behavior.
5 Discussion
We can summarize our ﬁndings in six observations:
Observation 1 Our results in treatment SO-R replicate the ﬁndings of Selten
and Ockenfels (1998) and Ockenfels and Weimann (1999).
We have replicated the results of the original solidarity game even if we
have introduced the following variations: laboratory pen and paper experiment,
double blind with a monitor, no lottery, and instant payment.
Observation 2 Aggregate and individual behavior in the solidarity game is
robust against the strategy method.
We have shown that the observed values of gift giving in the design of Sel-
ten and Ockenfels (1998) are not due to the strategy method, i.e., deciding
without knowing if one is a winner or not. Thus, we have to reject our Hypoth-
esis 1. Implicit reciprocity generated by the use of the strategy method does
not contribute to the explanation of gift giving in this game.
Indeed positive gifts in the solidarity game are consistent with previous
ﬁndings from dictator experiments. However, the evidence for the impact of the
strategy method on behavior is mixed. In this paper we present results which
strengthen the opinion of no inﬂuence of the strategy method on behavior,
similar to Brandts and Charness (2000) and Bolton and Katok (1995b). The
strategy method is therefore an appropriate tool to study gift giving behavior.
Observation 3 In treatment CGE the predominance of ’ﬁxed total sacriﬁce’
behavior is displaced by ’ﬁxed relative gift’ behavior.
Our experimental analysis conﬁrms that the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce is the most
common behavior in the solidarity game when the winner’s endowment remains
constant over all the possible scenarios of the game (as in our treatments SO-R
and PPM). Selten and Ockenfels (1998) explain the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce eﬀect
19with a two-stage reasoning process: in a ﬁrst step dictators decide how much to
keep for themselves, and in a second step they distribute the remaining amount
across potential receivers.
However, in our treatment CGE the predominance of ﬁxed total sacriﬁce
behavior disappears, and is substituted by ﬁxed relative gift behavior. While the
diﬀerence between both treatments is that the winner’s endowment is doubled
for the two-loser case in CGE, subjects respond by quadrupling their total
gift in the two losers case. Table 11 compares both predominant behaviors in
treatments SO-R and CGE.
’Fixed total sacriﬁce’ ’Fixed relative gift’
in SO-R in CGE
1 loser 2 loser 1 loser 2 loser
Group endowment 20 10 20 20
Individual endowment 10 10 10 20
Absolute gift to each loser x 1
2 x x 2x
Relative gift to each loser x/10 1
2 x/10 x/10 x/10
Absolute total gift x x x 4x
Relative total gift x/10 x/10 x/10 2 x/10
Absolute expected income of loser 2x 1
2x 2x 2x
Relative expected income of loser x/10 1
2x/10 x/10 x/10
Absolute income of winner 10-x 10-x 10-x 20-4x
Relative income of winner 10-x/20 10-x/10 10-x/20 10-2x/10
Average x 2.24 2.74 2.17 2.21
Table 11: Comparisons between the predominant behavior in treatment SO-R, ’ﬁxed
total sacriﬁce’. and the predominant behavior in treatment CGE, ’ﬁxed relative gift’;
0 < x ≤ 5. The average x is calculated from the subjects showing this behavior
including rounding.
The reasoning process proposed by Selten and Ockenfels (1998) is not visible
in our data from treatment CGE. We cannot imagine such a cognitive process
which could cover both types of behavior exhibited in the two treatments. Es-
sentially, we ﬁnd a shift from self-centered ’ﬁxed total sacriﬁce’ behavior in
treatment SO-R to other-regarding ’ﬁxed relative gift’ behavior in treatment
CGE. In the ﬁrst case, winners keep their own (relative) income constant re-
gardless if there are one or two losers in the group. In the second case, winners
give gifts in a way that the (expected) income of each loser is constant regardless
if there are one or two of them.
Observation 4 Expectations of gift behavior are close in mean, but signiﬁ-
cantly higher than actual decisions in pair wise comparisons.
20Selten and Ockenfels (1998) and Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) report that
subjects on average guessed quite well when asked for the average gift of all par-
ticipants in the solidarity game. They explained this with the ’false consensus’
eﬀect, i.e. the general tendency to overestimate one’s similarity to others. In
our experiment we found the same pattern, and the correlation coeﬃcients re-
ported in Section 4.3 indicate an even stronger false consensus eﬀect. However,
contrary to the other experiments we found that subjects expect higher average
gifts than they give themselves, which is mainly driven by subjects contributing
few or nothing.
Observation 5 Economists contribute signiﬁcantly less than students from other
ﬁelds of study. We do not observe a gender or age eﬀect.
The fact that economists behave diﬀerently has also been found by other
studies, including Selten and Ockenfels (1998) and Ockenfels and Weimann
(1999). Marwell and Ames (1981) report that economics graduate students were
much more likely to free ride than any other of their groups of subjects. Frank,
Gilovich and Regan (1993) conducted a prisoner’s dilemma game in which they
compared the defection rates of economic majors and non-majors. Their results
show that economic majors are more likely to behave self-interested than other
students. The defection rates are 60.4% compared to 38.8%.
We cannot say where these diﬀerences come from. They might be due to the
education of the subjects which means that the subjects adopt the basic axioms
of their studies. That would denote that there is learning. On the other side,
the diﬀerences might be due to personal characteristics. Carter and Irons (1991)
propose a hypothesis in which they argue that people with certain attitudes self
select into economics. In a study they accomplished with freshmen and senior
economists and non-economists, they had to reject the learning hypothesis but
could conﬁrm the selection hypothesis. Thus, they argue, ”Economists are
born, not made.”
Observation 6 There is no correlation between individual characteristics mea-
sured by the Interpersonal Reactivity Index and actual gift behavior.
The lack of correlation might indicate that while the IRI test measures (em-
pathic) solidarity attitudes; the gift giving in the context of the solidarity game
can be explained by fairness preferences, but not by empathy driven solidarity.
This coincides with our ﬁnding that implicit reciprocity induced by the use of
the strategy method plays no role for the size of gifts.
216 Conclusions
¿From the results of SO-R and PPM we can conclude that the level and the
type of other regarding behavior is analogous to the ﬁndings of ?. Under
these conditions the modal individual behavior is the ﬁxed total sacriﬁce. This
behavior can be interpreted as self-centered, considering that the winners decide
ﬁrst the amount they want to keep independently from the number of recipients,
and then distribute the rest to the needy person(s).
The comparison between SO-R and PPM conditions shows that empathy
does not explain gift giving. Indeed, the level of gift giving does not decrease
when the strategy method is removed. The independency of our results from
empathy driven behavior is conﬁrmed by the comparison between the IRI and
actual gift behavior. Indeed, subjects with a higher level of empathic-driven
pro-social predisposition do not perform higher gift giving or more egalitarian
type of behavior in the solidarity game.
By contrast, the ﬁndings from the CGE condition show a dramatic increase
of other regarding behavior of the egalitarian type. The winner keeps the
amount of gift for each recipient in the one loser and two loser case constant.
Therefore when the subject is the only winner in the group she takes her re-
sponsibility in keeping the endowment of each one of the two losers at a fair
level.
Comparing the three conditions of our experiment we can conclude that the
nature of the other regarding behavior depends on donors’ endowment; when it
is kept constant between the two contingent cases, the donors behave in a self-
centered way; whereas, when it increases from the one loser to the two losers
case, they behave in a more egalitarian way.
22A Instructions
Translated from German.
Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment. Please read these
instructions carefully. If you have any question, please raise your hand. We will
come to your place and answer your questions. It is prohibited to communicate
with the other participants during the experiment. Otherwise, we shall have to
exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.
These instructions are identical for all participants. Furthermore, all forms,
which have to be ﬁlled in during this Experiment, are identical for all partici-
pants.
The experiment
Each participant is a member of a randomly formed three-person-group. Each
member of a group might win a certain amount of money that will be speciﬁed
in the decision form. The probability to win is 2
3. The probability to loose is
therefore 1
3. So, obviously, there are four possibilities:
1. the three members of a group win
2. one member wins and the other two loose
3. two members win and the other one looses
4. the three members loose
If you are a winner you will receive the amount speciﬁed in the decision
form. From this amount you can voluntarily hand something over to the losers
in your group. Your payoﬀ is therefore the amount you received minus the
amount you gave to the loser(s) in your group.
Your decisions are absolutely anonymous. Due to the following procedure it is
guaranteed that neither the other participants nor the experimenters can assign
decisions which were made to certain persons.
Procedure
1. You will be asked to draw an envelope from a box. This box contains as
many envelopes as participants in this experiment. Inside each envelope
you ﬁnd a card with a code number that just you know. Please keep this
card and show it to no other participant or to one of the experimenters
23except to the monitor mentioned under point 8 in this procedure.
One of these cards is marked with the word ’monitor’. This ’monitor’ will
guarantee that this experiment will be conducted as it is written here.
The monitor himself will not participate in this experiment.
If you are not the monitor, you ﬁnd three further envelopes (blue, red,
green). Please do not open these envelopes before we ask you to do so.
We will tell you when to open each particular envelope.
2. Then everybody except the monitor has to open the blue envelope. In
this envelope you will ﬁnd a decision form, which is marked with your
code number on the backside. Please ﬁll in this decision form completely.
After you have ﬁlled in this form please put it back into the envelope and
close the envelope. Once everybody has ﬁlled in the decision form, the
monitor will collect them all with a box.
3. Then every participant (except the monitor) will open the green envelope
when we ask them to do. Inside you will ﬁnd another form with your
code number on the backside. Please ﬁll in this form completely, put it
back into the envelope and close the envelope. Once everybody has ﬁlled
in the form, the monitor will collect the green envelopes.
4. After this we will ask you to open the red envelope. Inside you will ﬁnd
a third and last form. Please ﬁll in this form completely as well and put
it back into the envelope. Once everybody has ﬁlled in the form, the
monitor will collect the red envelopes.
5. The monitor will draw one envelope at a time from the box containing
the blue envelopes with the decision forms. She / he will throw a normal
six-sided dice once for each decision form. If one of the numbers 1, 2, 3,
or 4 appears, the monitor will write ’winner’ on the envelope. If one of
the numbers 5 or 6 appears he or she will write ’loser’ on the envelope.
After this all envelopes are put back into the box and are mixed again.
6. The monitor will draw again the blue envelopes from the box. The en-
velopes will be randomly matched in groups of three. For each group the
experimenters will open the envelopes and calculate the payoﬀ. Please
notice that the experimenters don’t know and won’t know the identity of
the participants.
7. After the calculation of the payoﬀs, the experimenters will put the money
into envelopes which are marked with the code numbers. After this the
experimenters leave the room.
248. The monitor will now come to each of the participants. Please give
her/him your code number. The monitor will give you then the corre-
sponding envelope. Please do not yet open the envelope.
9. When all envelopes are distributed the monitor will take the experimenters
in again. When we tell you to do so, please open the envelope and check
the money.
10. After this you can leave the room. At the door there will be a list with
all code numbers and the corresponding payoﬀs. Please sign there that
you received money in cash under one of these code numbers. Due to this




Your group consists of three participants.
In case of three winners in your group each of you receives ten euro.
In case of two winners in your group each of the two winners receives ten
euro, the loser receives zero euro.
In case that you are one of the two winners in your group:
How much of your ten euro would you give to the loser in your group? (each
amount between zero and ten euro is possible, in ten cent steps)
Please enter the amount here: ..........
In case of one winner in your group, the winner receives ten euro, and both
losers receive zero euro.
In case that your are the winner :
How much of your ten euro would you give to each of the two losers in your
group?(each amount between zero and ten euro is possible, in ten cent steps)
Please enter the amount here: ..........
In case of no winner in your group each of you receives zero euro.
Please put this decision form back into the blue envelope and close it.
25Expectations form.
In the previous form you could say how much you would give to the loser(s)
in your group in case that you are a winner.. How much do you think do the
other participants give on average to each loser in the group?
in case of one loser in the group:...........
in case of two losers in the group:.............
Please notice, you get one extra euro if one of the amounts is exact or dif-
fers at most 50 cent, or two euro extra if both of the amounts are exact or diﬀer
at most 50 cent each.
Please put this form back into the envelope.
3rd form: Interpersonal Reactivity Index Questionnaire
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might
happen to me. (FS)
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.
(EC)
3. I sometimes ﬁnd it diﬃcult to see things from the ’other guy’s’ point of
view. (PT-)
4. Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having
problems. (EC-)
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS)
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD)
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or a play, and I don’t often
get completely caught up in it. (FS-)
8. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
(PT)
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective
towards them (EC)
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional
situation. (PD)
2611. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things
look from their perspective. (PT)
12. Being extremely involved in a book or movie is somewhat rare for me.
(FS-)
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (PD-)
14. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC-)
15. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening
to other people’s arguments. (PT-)
16. After seeing a play or a movie, I have felt as though I were one of the
characters. (FS)
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD)
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very
much pity for them. (EC-)
19. I am usually pretty eﬀective in dealing with emergencies. (PD-)
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC)
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and I try to look at
them both. (PT)
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC)
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of
a leading character. (FS)
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD)
25. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to ’put myself in his shoes’ for
a while. (PT)
26. When I’m reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would
feel if the events in the story were happening to me. (FS)
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces.
(PD)
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in
their place. (PT)
27C Decision data and types of behavior
Abbreviations: EGO - egoistical, E FTS - exact ﬁxed total sacriﬁce, R FTS -
ﬁxed total sacriﬁce up to rounding, IM - intermediate, E FG - Exact ﬁxed gift,
R FG - Fixed gift up to rounding, W/L - winner/loser.
Treat Session Code W/L g1 g2 e1 e2 Type abs. Type rel.
SO-R 1 666-R29-X9B W 0 0 1.5 2 EGO EGO
947-P85-D4B W 2 1 2 1 E FTS E FTS
599-B58-S5B L 0 0 1 1 EGO EGO
192-T52-P7B W 1.5 0.5 2 1 g1 > 2g2 g1 > 2g2
922-U76-P6B W 1 0.5 1 0.5 E FTS E FTS
803-F46-U8B L 0 0 2.5 1.5 EGO EGO
939-X60-L1B W 1 0.5 2.5 3 E FTS E FTS
537-T68-Q6B W 0 0 0 0 EGO EGO
104-U69-C0B W 1 1 1 0.6 E FG E FG
690-O30-N8B W 1.5 1.5 1 0.5 E FG E FG
521-Z25-J0B L 0 0 0.5 0.25 EGO EGO
527-P70-I7B W 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 E FG E FG
800-C56-Z4B W 3.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 IM IM
578-A66-Z1B W 0 1 2.5 1 g2 > g1 g2¿g1
872-T19-W7B L 0 1 0 1 g2 > g1 g2¿g1
2 264-U27-Z3D W 1.5 1 1 0.5 R FTS R FTS
544-M76-W2D W 2.5 2 3 2 R FTS R FTS
229-J97-W7D W 1.5 1 1.5 1 R FTS R FTS
439-O42-J6D W 3.9 2.5 4 2.1 IM IM
596-C67-E8D W 0 0 2 1 EGO EGO
475-A48-B3D W 0 0 1 1 EGO EGO
842-M37-W2D W 3.1 2 1.5 0.8 R FTS R FTS
398-J11-C3D L 3 1.5 2.5 4 E FTS E FTS
162-G63-G1D W 2 1 2.5 2 E FTS E FTS
985-R51-N0D W 3 2 6 4 R FTS R FTS
376-J15-S6D L 0 0 0 0 EGO EGO
371-J32-I9D W 3 2 3 2 R FTS R FTS
379-V22-W7D L 3 2 2.5 1.5 R FTS R FTS
412-F97-V0D W 1 1 1 1 E FG E FG
457-K57-A1D W 2.5 1.3 4 2 E FTS E FTS
CGE 3 396-H88-E4F W 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 E FG E FTS
827-V98-U3F L 3.3 6.7 3 6 g2 > g1 E FG
751-K67-T2F W 0 2.5 0 2 g2 > g1 g2¿g1
308-J22-X3F W 2 4 3.8 4.2 g2 > g1 E FG
993-V30-C5F W 0 0 1 3 EGO EGO
416-D67-J9F L 0 0 1 2 EGO EGO
560-Z26-U2F L 0 0 0.5 0.5 EGO EGO
779-O79-R8F L 2.1 4 3.3 3.1 g2 > g1 R FG
324-O56-W5F L 0 0 1.5 1.5 EGO EGO
876-P70-K1F W 0 0 0 0 EGO EGO
717-P41-Z6F L 2 4 2 2 g2 > g1 E FG
793-C25-R9F W 3 7 1.5 5 g2 > g1 R FG
801-B82-L5F W 2.5 5 1 2 g2 > g1 E FG
174-O38-X3F L 0 0 2 2 EGO EGO
737-R48-O4F W 3.3 5 2 3.3 g2 > g1 IM
4 117-J25-Y5H W 3 5 2.5 7.5 g2 > g1 IM
351-Z90-U9H W 2 4 3 4 g2 > g1 E FG
794-K47-Q5H L 2 4 2 5 g2 > g1 E FG
907-Z59-Q7H W 0 0 1.2 2 EGO EGO
279-I52-N3H L 1 2 1 2 g2 > g1 E FG
413-O49-C1H W 1 2 2 3 g2 > g1 E FG
984-J71-G0H L 0 0 0.5 1 EGO EGO
965-O31-Y2H L 3 4 2 3 g2 > g1 IM
684-S97-R4H L 3 4 2 4 g2 > g1 IM
207-Z95-J9H W 1.5 2 1.5 2 g2 > g1 IM
674-G87-V0H W 3 4 2.5 6 g2 > g1 IM
795-D88-A7H W 3 5 4 4 g2 > g1 IM
957-V79-P5H W 0 0 2 1 EGO EGO
213-C34-J3H W 3 6 1.5 2.5 g2 > g1 E FG
155-E83-O0H W 4.5 4.5 3 5 E FG E FTS
PPM 5 696-O29-K9J W 1 1 1.5 1 E FG E FG
576-W26-O5J W 3 2 4 3 R FTS R FTS
538-P89-A4J L 2 1.5
28Treat Session Code W/L g1 g2 e1 e2 Type abs. Type rel.
199-R10-E3J W 3 2.5 2.5 2.2 IM IM
627-R63-F1J W 0 0 1 0.5 EGO EGO
877-S79-H7J L 3.5 0.7
303-Q58-V8J W 3 2 3 2 R FTS R FTS
200-J58-Z1J W 0 0 0.25 0.1 EGO EGO
673-J84-L9J W 2 1.5 2 2 IM IM
552-J91-C6J W 2 1 3 2 E FTS E FTS
763-K48-Q3J W 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 E FG E FG
244-C49-K7J L 2 1
768-M19-J1J W 0 0 2 1 EGO EGO
983-J58-H4J L 3 2
844-H56-X4J L 3 2
6 559-F49-N7L W 0 0 3 1.5 EGO EGO
450-H79-B4L W 2 1 2.5 1.3 E FTS E FTS
132-S80-T5L W 1 1 3 2 E FG E FG
979-W97-D6L W 1 1 0.5 0.5 E FG E FG
421-D99-M0L W 0 0 0 0 EGO EGO
652-Y77-S5L L 2.5 2.5
899-Q62-T9L W 1.5 1 3.6 2 R FTS R FTS
521-J80-T4L L 1 0
612-R72-G6L L 5 2
507-I73-X2L W 1 1 1 1 E FG E FG
916-I48-V5L W 6 3 6.2 3.3 E FTS E FTS
269-Q78-K5L W 1.5 1 1 0.5 R FTS R FTS
834-V15-M8L W 2 1.5 1.1 1 IM IM
661-E94-K6L L 1.5 1
773-O44-V1L L 4 1
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